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Throughout 2008, a small band of Canadians living and working 
alongside soldiers of the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) occupied an 
isolated outpost in Panjwayi district 
designated Strongpoint Mushan. 
Once the pivotal leg of an ambitious 
security and development plan, 
Strongpoint Mushan quickly became 
an orphan as priorities changed, 
the plan shifted, and the weight of 
available friendly forces moved to 
the eastern part of the district. At the 
same time, abandoning Strongpoint 
Mushan after  such a  lengthy 
occupation would not only result in 
a Taliban propaganda victory, but 
would also remove the only coalition 
presence in that part of Panjwayi, a 
presence that was aggravating the 
Taliban leadership in its attempts to 
challenge Canada and Afghanistan 
for control of the vital districts 
west of Kandahar City. There was 
no good solution to this dilemma, 
so the position was kept manned 
and resupplied in an increasingly 
dangerous environment, even when 
it was cut off on the ground. This is 
the story of the Canadian soldiers of 
the Operational Mentor and Liaison 
Teams (OMLT) and the Afghan 
soldiers they worked with in the 
defence of Strongpoint Mushan.1
Why Mushan?
Mushan is  geographica l ly important to coalition efforts 
west of Kandahar City. Looking 
at a map, the embattled triangular 
Zharey district lies south of Ring 
Road South (Highway 1), the main 
International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) service route to the 
forces fighting in Helmand province 
and the primary commerce artery in 
and through Afghanistan. Panjwayi 
district, also triangular in shape, lies 
to the south of Zharey district, with 
the Arghandab River separating the 
two. The forbidding Registan Desert 
is directly south of Panjwayi district, 
with the Dowry River separating 
the two. The tapered western point 
of Panjwayi district marks the 
confluence of the Arghandab and 
Dowry rivers – it is also the meeting 
place of Zharey, Panjwayi, and the 
Band-e Timor communities from 
Maywand district. Maywand leads to 
the Helmand river valley, and routes 
from that region branch to Baram Cha 
in Pakistan (see map on next page).
 The enemy needed to facilitate 
the movement of enemy personnel, 
supplies and weapons from Baram 
Cha–Helmand Valley–Maywand into 
Panjwayi. Once in Panjwayi, there are 
other routes that lead into both the 
southwest suburbs of Kandahar City 
and to the “rocket box” northwest of 
Kandahar Air Field where 107 mm 
rockets are fired at this vital ISAF 
logistics and support facility. This 
route is also one of several used by 
those engaged in the transport of 
narcotics to Pakistan. A strongpoint 
at Mushan is extremely inconvenient 
for the Taliban, the Hezb-e-Islami 
Gulbuddin (HiG) and other anti-
government and criminal elements. 
 In 2006, Mushan was quiet as the 
Operation Medusa battles raged in 
Pashmul and Sperwan Ghar. It was 
widely believed that the “police” 
presence in Mushan at that time was 
really a militia belonging to elements 
in the provincial power structure that 
had some relationship to the narcotics 
trade. Mushan was important to them 
as product could not move along 
Ring Road South or through Zharey 
district because of the fighting that 
raged there throughout the year.
 In mid-2007, Task Force Kandahar 
(TFK) formulated a plan to construct a 
road from Panjwayi town to Mushan, 
and then another from Mushan to 
Ring Road South. In general the 
idea was to facilitate commerce and 
security in this extremely fertile 
district. Mushan was the pivot for this 
project and its enhanced stature in 
the plan resulted in the construction 
Abstract: The future of Afghanistan 
rests in the country’s ability to field 
effective national security forces. 
Canada has played a significant role in 
mentoring the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) since 2003. By 2008, the ANA 
was operating in battalion strength 
in Kandahar province. Strongpoint 
Mushan was a vital position that 
interfered with enemy activity in 
the region and the men from the 
Operational Mentoring and Liaison 
Team and their Afghan counterparts 
held that ground in the face of vast 
amounts of firepower directed at their 
positions.
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of better defensive facilities there. 
In time, Afghan National Police 
replaced the local “police,” the 
defensive works were designated a 
“police sub-station” and a National 
Directorate of Security detachment 
moved in. This in turn increased 
enemy interest in Mushan which was 
demonstrated by a significant rise in 
insurgent violence in the western part 
of Panjwayi district. Subsequently the 
decision was made to designate the 
police sub-station as a strongpoint 
and then deploy Afghan National 
Army troops to Mushan. 
 In early 2008,  Strongpoint 
Mushan was one of a line of police 
sub-stations and strongpoints 
along the Panjwayi-Mushan road. 
Enemy forces mounted a campaign 
against this chain of facilities, which 
escalated throughout the spring 
of 2008. Mechanized forces had to 
be used to resupply and replace 
personnel along this chain which 
in turn attracted enemy Improvised 
Explosives Device (IED) cells. The 
battle along the Panjwayi-Mushan 
road nearly became a sub-campaign 
unto itself partly because the absence 
of Canadian helicopters forced TFK 
to mount costly ground resupply 
operations. There were no fewer 
than 14 IED attacks directed against 
Canadian vehicles during this period. 
Eventually, the decision was made to 
cease ground resupply and a variety 
of aerial solutions were explored, 
including the use of contracted 
civilian Mi-8 helicopters. 
 The situation also resulted in 
the redeployment of forces away 
from some of the police sub-stations 
along the Mushan-Panjwayi road 
which added to  the  physical 
and psychological isolation of 
Strongpoint Mushan. There were 
higher level considerations. The 
Canadian government was a minority 
government anticipating an election 
campaign some time in 2008 in which 
the costly commitment to Afghanistan 
would undoubtedly be an issue. Any 
enemy analysis of Canadian media 
would have concluded that casualties 
inflicted against Canadian forces 
would have a strategic effect on 
Canada’s commitment to a combat 
role. At the same time, Canadian 
and Afghan forces could not retreat 
from Mushan for operational and 
psychological reasons. These factors 
collided in the fight over Mushan, 
with the Canadian soldiers from the 
OMLT and the Afghan soldiers from 
the Kandaks caught in the middle. 
Mushan had to hold. 
The OMLT and the Kandaks
Coalition soldiers have been used to train the emergent Afghan 
National Army since 2002. When 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
was the main coalition effort in 
Afghanistan, Embedded Training 
Teams (ETTs) were the primary 
connection point between the ANA 
and the coalition forces at the tactical 
level. As NATO ISAF gradually 
supplanted OEF and more non-North 
American countries joined the effort, 
new terminology emerged – the 
Operational Mentor and Liaison 
Team or OMLT. 
 The ETTs were similar to Vietnam-
era Special Forces A-Teams working 
with non-professional indigenous 
forces. Indeed, the burden of ETT 
work initially fell on the 19th and 20th 
Special Forces Groups in the early 
days of the war. As the ANA emerged 
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as an institution, the ETTs shifted to 
a more conventional posture as the 
intent was to create a professional 
army to replace the Special Forces-
backed militias. A US National Guard 
brigade took over this mission from 
the special forces by 2004. The NATO-
led OMLTs were originally supposed 
to supplement the OEF ETTs and 
provide mentoring at brigade and 
higher levels, but as NATO took 
greater control of the coalition effort, 
the NATO OMLTs increasingly 
handled tasks previously done by 
the ETTs. Confusingly, ETTs and 
OMLTs shared the same battlespace 
throughout Afghanistan. 
 Canada’s involvement with 
mentoring at the tactical level dates 
back to 2003-4 when a Canadian ETT 
worked with ANA units in Kabul. At 
that time, the Canadian ETT consisted 
of 15 personnel led by a major who 
worked closely with a “kandak,” the 
ANA equivalent of a battalion. That 
commitment evolved into significant 
Canadian involvement with the 
Kabul Military Training Centre 
from 2003 to 2006, where Canadians 
worked alongside American, French 
and British soldiers and their Afghan 
counterparts to raise, train, and equip 
the kandaks that would form the 
manoeuvre forces of the ANA. 
 For a variety of reasons related 
to the deterioration of the situation 
in Kandahar province, Canada 
committed more resources to the 
expansion of OMLTs in the fall of 
2006. By this time 205 ANA Corps 
was stood up and the kandaks 
assigned to operations in Regional 
Command South came under its 
control. 1st Brigade of 205 Corps, or 
1/205 Brigade, was established by 
2007 to handle ANA operations in 
the province. 1/205 Brigade’s kandaks 
varied in number, however, and it 
would be a mistake to assume that 
1/205 Brigade had the same level 
of stability that a Canadian brigade 
has. In 2006, it wavered between 
one and three kandaks. At that time 
the Canadian OMLT was capable of 
mentoring a single kandak.
 T h e  O M LT  r e q u i r e m e n t s 
increased dramatically in 2007, to 
the point where nearly an entire 
Canadian infantry battalion was 
required to reorganize into OMLTs 
to mentor the various components of 
1/205 Brigade. 3rd Battalion, Princess 
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 
an organization whose soldiers 
and officers had on average two 
tours in Afghanistan, was selected. 
3 PPCLI was the first Canadian 
infantry battalion to have any 
contact with Afghans back in 2002. 
Subsequently, “B” Company was 
the force protection company for 
the Provincial Reconstruction Team 
when it was first established in 
2005. In other words, these soldiers 
had experience working with 
Afghans, and specifically Afghans 
from Kandahar province, in non-
traditional situations. 
 In 2008, 1/205 Brigade consisted 
of five kandaks totalling, on a good 
day, around 2,900 personnel. There 
were three infantry kandaks 1/1, 1/2 
and 1/3, a combat support kandak 
(4/1) and a combat service support 
kandak (5/1). For transport, each 
kandak had a varying number of Ford 
Ranger pickup trucks, Hummers 
armed with 12.7 mm machine guns, 
and International 7-ton trucks. Paper 
organizational charts are, however, 
deceiving when dealing with Afghan 
units. In general, not all three infantry 
kandaks were deployed at once. 
Some were undergoing refit, others 
had personnel on leave. There were 
always a percentage of personnel 
absent without leave for reasons 
that cannot always be attributed to 
shirking of duty. Local conditions 
meant that it could take days for 
soldiers on leave just to get home. 
The CS and CSS kandaks at this 
point were not fully manned nor 
were the more specialized trades 
like engineers and logisticians fully 
trained. 
Introducing 1/1 Kandak and 
the Kandak 1/1/205 OMLT 
Team 2
The Kandak assigned to Zharey distr ic t  in  the  spring and 
summer of 2008 was 1/1 Kandak, 
commanded by Colonel Anwar. 
1/1 had three infantry companies, 
Brigadier -General  Gul Aqa Nibi , 
commander of 205 Corp (Kandak 2-1-
205) Afghan National Army, gives an 
interview to Canadian reporters after 
the Transfer of Command Authority 
Ceremony held at Joint Task Force 
Afghanistan HQ, Kandahar Airfield, 
Afghanistan, 11 May 2008.
Photo by Corporal S.J. McNeil, Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) AR2008-M005-06
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each of about 70 men; a weapons 
company of 188 personnel divided 
into four platoons; a headquarters 
and headquarters company and a 
combat service support company of 
around 70 men. 1/1 and its support 
companies were based out of Forward 
Operating Base (FOB) Masum’Ghar, 
with two companies deployed to 
FOB Sperwan Ghar and another 
to Strongpoint Mushan. Three of 
the weapons company platoons 
occupied strongpoints along the 
Panjwayi-Mushan road. 1/1 Kandak’s 
leadership included a tactically 
and politically proficient executive 
officer who kept things together. 
1/1 Kandak’s strength lay in its non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and 
their regimental sergeant-major 
(RSM). The operations sergeant and 
company sergeants-major were rated 
as strong. Their officers, however, 
were generally weak. They suffered 
from poor French training in Kabul 
and some were appointed because of 
political or tribal relationships. The 
OMLT constantly strove to present to 
the Afghans a national outlook. That 
said, an estimated 60 percent of 1/1 
was Pashtun, and Uzbeks dominated 
the other 40 percent. Dari was the 
language of choice, with Pashtun 
used informally. Notably, the NCOs 
publicly declared that “We are one 
Army” and generally did not engage 
in divisive ethnicity issues. 
 1 / 1  K a n d a k  w a s  f a i r l y 
experienced. It was formed in Kabul 
back in 2002 where it initially acted 
as part of President Hamid Karzai’s 
protection force. 1/1 spent a lot 
of time projecting from Kabul to 
provinces in Regional Command East 
when a surge was required. In 2005 it 
was sent to Oruzgan province, where 
it worked with a Dutch OMLT and 
an American ETT. While in Oruzgan, 
1/1 focused on becoming proficient 
at platoon-level operations. Two 
companies of 1/1 were deployed to 
retake the Chora District Centre in 
an action that took place in 2007. This 
required what was euphemistically 
called “heavy mentoring” by the 
ETT and the Dutch OMLT. It was not 
proficient at independent kandak-
level operations when it re-deployed 
to Kandahar in November 2007. 1/1 
entered the line in Panjwayi district 
in late February 2008. 
 The Canadian OMLT paralleled 
the kandak structure. Kandak 1/1/205 
OMLT Team, as it was formally 
known, was commanded initially by 
Major Mark Campbell (until he was 
critically wounded in June and then 
replaced by Major David Proctor) and 
consisted of 26 Canadian soldiers. 
A Canadian soldier assigned to the OMLT (Operational 
Mentoring and Liaison Team) on sentry duty at a strongpoint 
operated jointly by Canadian and Afghan soldiers.
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Sixteen of these were the company 
mentors, with each team consisting 
of four men and an RG-31 Nyala 
armoured vehicle: their callsigns were 
71A through 71D. The OMLT also had 
a five-man command post with an 
RG-31 armoured patrol vehicle and 
an eight-wheeled Bison, callsign 71. 
There were three specialized mentors 
(logistics, medical, and operations) 
and a sergeant-major mentor. Each 
company team consisted of a captain, 
a warrant officer, and two corporals 
or privates. However, the leave 
plan and field injuries meant that 
on many occasions the four-man 
teams could be reduced to one or 
two men. Similarly, not all of the 
vehicles were operational as the 
OMLT had no integral electrical and 
mechanical engineering support 
and could not always draw on other 
Canadian resources, especially if 1/1 
Kandak was operating away from 
the Canadian battlegroup. In effect, 
a skeletal Canadian light infantry 
company mentored a motorized 
Afghan kandak that was operating 
in a static role. 
 Working with Afghan soldiers 
was an eye-opening experience to 
Canadian soldiers trained in the 
context of Western culture and a 
European-based military system. 
The ANA had uniforms, most of 
which were various versions of 
the American woodland pattern 
battledress, and wore different 
coloured berets. All the men had 
helmets and 95 percent had body 
armour in the infantry companies 
though bravado discouraged them 
from wearing the protective gear. 
Chest rigs predominated instead of 
traditional webbing.
 Culturally, the Afghan troops 
were uneducated reflecting what 
had happened to the country over 
the past 20 years. The mentors noted 
problems with learning, problem 
solving, and abstract thinking. 
The Afghan soldiers had difficulty 
conceptualizing second and third 
order effects, but more importantly 
many had trouble associating ground 
with its depiction on a map. Math 
skills were limited. “The planning 
cycle,” as one mentor explained, “was 
moment to moment.” Again, this was 
not surprising since the young men 
emerged from a survivalist culture 
where life expectancy was short and 
the Taliban discouraged the study of 
anything other than the Koran.
 The Afghan soldiers  were 
extremely polite and respectful of 
elders. They understood “place”and 
rank,  and tended to  be  non-
confrontational. They would go 
out of their way not to humiliate 
guests in any way, as hospitality 
was a cornerstone of not only the 
Pashtunwali code, but of Afghan 
society generally. Their faith was an 
integral aspect of their daily lives, 
to the point where it could interfere 
with operations. Soldiers would pray 
collectively before, after, and even 
during patrols – a sentry would be 
deployed as the prayer mats were 
pulled out. 
 For the most part, the Afghan 
soldiers understood the basics and 
they could work as a team. The main 
problems lay in planning, combat 
service support, and their tendency 
Right: A Canadian sergeant of the 
Operation Mentor and Liaison Team 
(OMLT) (right) comes back from an 
operation with Canadian and Afghan 
soldiers.
Below right: An OMLT RG-31 Nyala light 
armoured vehicle parks in front of  a line 
of Afghan National Army Ford Ranger 
trucks mounting 12.7 mm machine 
guns at a leaguer near the village of 
Nakhonay, in the Panjawai district.
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to be reactive. The danger in any 
OMLT was that the mentors would 
take over the problem-solving tasks 
and the teams had to be vigilant in 
passing on this responsibility to the 
Afghan leaders. Clearly, there was no 
impetus to improve if the Canadians 
did everything for them. The Afghan 
NCOs did lead by example and that 
was considered to be a major positive 
factor. 
 The war around Mushan in early 
2008 revolved around efforts to affect 
a relief-in-place (RIP) of the forces 
stationed in Mushan. The outgoing 
OMLT and ANA company from 
another kandak was replaced with 
a new rotation in early March. This 
was a complex operation involving 
a strong mechanized force that 
encountered significant enemy 
resistance. By the end of March 1/1 
Kandak had a company in Mushan, 
another in and around Panjwayi town 
and bazaar, and another deployed 
up at a district centre in Ghorak. The 
kandak and its mentors initiated 
a patrolling programme along the 
Panjwayi-Mushan road, but with 
the lack of police in these locations, 
the best the teams could provide 
was a temporary day-time presence. 
Another  task was to  provide 
overwatch security to the Panjwayi-
Mushan road paving project that 
had just started near Panjwayi town. 
On occasion, coalition operations 
damaged property in the battle area. 
As the kandak and the OMLT had no 
integral Civil-Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) capability, they also sent out 
assessment patrols to note damage 
and pass the information back to 
the CIMIC teams at the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team. 
Mushan: Environs, 
Occupants, and Initial 
Operations
The strongpoint itself is located two kilometres east of Mushan 
village, next to the unpaved road. 
The Mushan Bazaar is approximately 
300 metres northwest of the position. 
On market days the bazaar, which 
is the economic centre for the area, 
swells to 400 people. Just south of 
the bazaar is a building that used to 
be used as a clinic. A small Kutchi3 
camp is situated to the northeast. 
For the most part, the terrain is flat 
This picture, taken from a Canadian CH-47 Chinook and facing west, shows the confluence of the Arghandab and Dowry Rivers 
where the Reg Desert, Maywand district, Zharey District, and western Panjwayi District meet. Mushan is indicated by an arrow.
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and consists of traditional Afghan 
compound complexes with high mud 
walls, grape growing trenches, grape 
drying huts, and walled growing 
areas for the crops. 
 Strongpoint Mushan is 100 
metres by 150 metres square. The 
main wall is made from Hescobastion 
and has two observation towers: 
one to the north, the other south. 
There are three run-up positions 
used by Ford Ranger vehicles with 
DsHkA and PKM machine guns 
mounted on them. A pit with a 60 
mm mortar occupies the centre. 
It has no air conditioning and is 
infested with sand fleas and ugly 
camel spiders. The ANA and the 
OMLT lived in modular tents, but 
there were several bunkers which 
consisted of a layer of sandbags, 
one man high. Concertina wire 
surrounded the perimeter, backed up 
with Claymore area defence weapons. 
ANA strength varied between 62 and 
68, amounting to two platoons. The 
the insurgent activities through Key 
Leader Engagements (KLEs) and by 
casual contact with the population. 
The Afghan soldiers, being more 
conversant with local culture than 
Canadians, had insight into the 
situation that an array of technical 
collection means could not match. 
For example, around 7 March, an 
ANA company commander held 
an impromptu shura at the bazaar. 
The local merchants told him that 
the enemy would mount significant 
operations against the strongpoint 
in a month’s time. The merchants 
were upset by this development 
and asked the Taliban to stay away 
from Mushan. This information was 
confirmed by a follow-up patrol. The 
remains of two failed 107 mm rocket 
launches, discovered on separate 
patrols, pointed towards a higher 
probability of future enemy action.
 The locals within the three to 
four kilometre security “bubble” 
around the strongpoint were 
generally apathetic but at the same 
time expressed positive sentiments 
about the ANA’s presence. Whoever 
was in charge, or appeared to be in 
charge, they would back. They were 
caught between the insurgents and 
the Afghan government and in effect 
determined that in Mushan it was too 
risky to take a position. It was easier 
to do nothing and just carry on with 
day-to-day life.
 Further patrolling and KLEs 
started to flesh out information about 
the enemy. There was a spotter or 
facilitator close to the strongpoint, 
and an estimated 12-15 insurgents 
within Mushan itself. Information 
suggested that the regular patrolling 
had a deterrent effect on this cell’s 
operations, that they were somewhat 
frustrated, and wanted help. They 
were particularly concerned about 
the coalition presence at the bazaar 
for unknown reasons. A week 
later, two men who were 
evidently monitoring the 
Ph
ot
o 
ta
ke
n 
by
 a
ut
ho
r
US
 A
rm
y 
Ph
ot
o 
 a
rm
y-
m
il-
37
15
5-
20
09
-0
5-
07
-0
80
53
7
ANA company at Mushan had a mix 
of PKM, DshKa, KpV 14.7 mm, and 
.50 cal machine guns augmented 
with RPG-7 rocket launchers. The 
first OMLT team into Mushan4 was 
71B, led by Captain Craig Robertson, 
and included Warrant Officer Rob 
Crane, Corporal “Rusty” Myroniuk, 
and Corporal Shaun Copeland. 
Generally, the Canadian OMLT team 
had three to four personnel stationed 
at Mushan. The OMLT personnel had 
their personal weapons, plus a Carl 
Gustav rocket launcher and M203 
grenade launcher attachments for 
their weapons. 
 For the most part, the platoons 
at Mushan ranged out three to four 
kilometres from the strongpoint. 
These “framework” patrols in and 
around Mushan and the bazaar 
produced significant information on 
A US Army OH-58D Kiowa Warrior in Afghanistan.
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movements of a patrol were detained. 
ISTAR reports about enemy interest 
in Strongpoint Mushan’s activities 
started to pick up in the area around 
mid-March. 
 71B and the 3rd Company soldiers 
then had a contact on 25 March three 
kilometres south of the strongpoint. 
Five insurgents armed with a PKM 
machine gun engaged the patrol 
from a compound. When the ANA 
deployed and fired back, the enemy 
withdrew. The Afghans caught a man 
who had enemy logistics documents 
in his possession. The following day, 
another ANA patrol and 71B were 
engaged by what was believed to 
be ten insurgents firing RPGs and 
PKMs from behind walls and a grape-
drying hut. During the 40-minute 
firefight, 71B fired M203 grenade 
launchers at the hut as a pair of 
OH-58Ds from Company “B” 2-17 
Cavalry (“The Banshees”) arrived 
on the scene. Using the splash of the 
grenades as a marker, the helicopters 
made six runs on the target firing .50 
cal machine guns and rocket pods 
as the ANA kept the enemy pinned 
down. Enemy firing ceased and, 
because the ANA patrol was critically 
short of ammunition, it withdrew 
while covered by an MQ-1 Predator 
UAV. One suspected insurgent was 
apprehended by a hastily-established 
vehicle check point and three enemy 
were seen to flee from the engagement 
in the direction of a Kutchi camp 
located near the Reg desert. Follow 
up KLEs suggested that the locals 
were concerned about the unusual 
increase in insurgent activity around 
Mushan.
 Notably, the ANA started to bring 
Afghan National Police (ANP) along 
with them during search operations, 
There was, however, a striking 
difference in the professionalism of 
the two forces. On one joint patrol, 
the ANA were appalled by the 
police behaviour towards women 
and lack of respect for property. The 
discussion between the two forces 
became quite vocal on one occasion. 
 At the beginning of April, the 
coalition mounted Operation Toor 
Azadi along Route Fosters. Toor 
Azadi was designed to resupply 
all of the police sub-stations and 
strongpoints and conduct a RIP 
for individuals and sub-units. 3rd 
Company was supposed to be part of 
this RIP. 71B and the ANA extended 
patrols to the east of Mushan as 
part of this effort. Unfortunately, as 
vehicle casualties mounted from IED 
attacks, the force halted to the east 
less than half way to Mushan. On 3 
April, the link up between the forces 
Canadian soldiers of the OMLT and Afghan National Army soldiers walk through a 
poppy field during an operation in the Panjwayi district, Afghanistan, 1 May 2008.
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occurred and 71A, consisting of 
Captain Matt Aggus, Warrant Officer 
John McNabb and Master Corporal 
Trevor Saina replaced 71B, while 3rd 
Company RIP’d with 1st Company. 
 The  team and i t s  Afghan 
c o u n t e r p a r t s  m o u n t e d  d a i l y 
framework patrols and compound 
s e a r c h e s  t h r o u g h o u t  A p r i l . 
Intelligence revealed that the enemy 
was annoyed at the continued 
presence of the force and planned 
to bring a mortar into the area but 
their logistics system was having 
problems deploying the weapon and 
its ammunition. 
  Resupply was a significant 
problem for the men occupying 
Strongpoint Mushan. The American 
and British transport helicopters 
supporting operations in Regional 
Command (South) would not fly in 
to Mushan unless they had AH-64 
Apache support. The operational 
tempo in RC(S) in the spring and 
summer of 2008 meant that there 
were few AH-64s available for 
a mundane resupply task. The 
Helicopter Landing 
Site at 
Mushan was exposed and subject 
to dust clouds, which were hard 
on helicopter engines. Emergency 
resupply became the order of the day, 
with food, water and ammo kicked 
out the doors of helicopters when 
they were available. Consideration 
was given to using C-130 Hercules 
from the multi-national pool to 
conduct parachute resupply 
drops using GPS-guided pallets, 
but instead the decision was 
made to use “Jingle Air,” 
civilian contractor-flown Mi-8 HIP 
helicopters, to resupply the combat 
outposts and strongpoints. One 
“Jingle Air” HIP dropped its load in a 
panic when confronted with a volley 
of RPGs on approach to another 
combat outpost. The enemy set an 
ambush which deterred recovery 
of the supplies, and then raided the 
pallet and exploited the contents of 
the mail bag for PSYOPS purposes 
against the Canadians manning the 
outpost. 
 After this debacle, aerial resupply 
of the strongpoints along FOSTERS 
was limited to the “emergency AMR” 
– a US Army UH-60 from Task Force 
Eagle Assault, escorted by a pair of 
OH-58D Kiowa Warriors from The 
Banshees (if AH-64 Apaches were 
unavailable as was usually the case), 
would land at the Mushan helicopter 
landing site, the crew chief would 
kick out boxes of ammo, and the 
Blackhawk would immediately 
l i f t off covered by the 
o r b i t i n g 
OH-58Ds. 
     When OMLT 
personnel had their 
mid-tour leave, they 
had to be escorted by a 
foot patrol east to the police 
sub-station at Talukan. This 
became a staple of life at 
Mushan when 71B came back in to 
replace 71A in mid-April. The 71B 
team instituted night patrolling in the 
area in order to increase the ANA’s 
proficiency at that art. This produced 
results in the ISTAR system, so more 
and more patrols were mounted as 
part of a “manouvre to collect” 
programme designed to flesh 
out the size and intentions of 
the enemy apparatus in and 
around Mushan. As patrolling 
became more regular around 
the bazaar, enemy forces from 
across the river in Zharey started to 
engage from a distance. The mentors 
recommended that the patrol plan 
include those areas, but the ANA 
company commander was reluctant 
to do so without air support so for 
the rest of April patrols focused on 
the bazaar and areas west of the town.
 In May, the 71A team, consisting 
of Aggus, McNabb, Saina and 
Corporal Dan Meeking, a medic who 
was attached from the Police OMLT, 
replaced 71B at Mushan during 
Operation Toor Azadi II. (Corporal 
Tyler Latta arrived back from leave 
later on and Meeking rotated out). 
There was an immediate spike in 
reports of unarmed enemy personnel 
observing this RIP operation, but 
again there was little enemy activity 
with the exception of an IED attack 
against a patrol from “B” Company, 2 
PPCLI, an ANA section, and mentors 
from 71A. This was a particularly 
gruesome attack in which the enemy 
used a ten-year-old boy to carry 
the explosives. This child was 
pushed ahead by an 
older man in the direction 
of the patrol, and then remotely 
detonated. The attack killed an ANA 
soldier and wounded two Canadians 
and one Afghan.5 
 By this time preparations for 
Operation Nolai was in progress. This 
was a 2 PPCLI battlegroup operation 
in Zharey district which was designed 
to move south from Ring Road 
South towards Mushan. The Mushan 
force was to play a supporting role 
by providing a feint to the south. 
On 26 May, however, a number of 
insurgents shot at an ANA patrol 
(accompanied by Warrant Officer 
John McNabb) from a compound. 
The Afghans mounted a clearance 
operation with “minimal prompting” 
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pilots from the former Soviet Union 
flew resupply missions to Strongpoint 
Mushan
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and their leadership retained a “cool 
demeanour” during the engagement. 
The enemy fled north into Zharey 
with “B” Company supported by 
an MQ-1 Predator in close pursuit. 
Within two days, the insurgents 
attacked the strongpoint with small 
arms fire from the direction of the old 
clinic. 
 The situation around Mushan 
deteriorated again on 31 May. Between 
15 and 20 insurgents split between 
four compounds ambushed a 20-man 
Afghan patrol and three Canadian 
mentors in a three-sided ambush, 
while the strongpoint simultaneously 
received harassing sniper fire. The 
ANA patrol endured ten minutes of 
small arms and RPG fire before the 
patrol sergeant organized his PKM 
machine guns to respond during a 
lull in the fire. The mentors joined 
in with an M-72 LAW and a M203 
grenade launcher. An enemy sniper 
then started to pick away at the 
Afghans who had gone to ground in 
a nearby wadi. The two M-777 guns 
from “C” Troop, “B” Battery, 1 RCHA 
under the command of Lieutenant 
Candice Dunn (who later became 
known as “The Angel of Death” by 
the some of the soldiers her troop was 
supporting) fired smoke to screen 
the ANA as they broke contact, leap-
frogging back in good order in two 
groups. ISTAR reports indicated that 
a Taliban cell leader and five other 
insurgents were killed during the 
course of these engagements. They 
were attempting their own version 
of a Key Leader Engagement at the 
time the patrol appeared. 
 The next day, several mortar 
rounds landed near the strongpoint. 
The Sperwan Ghar M-777s fired 
several smoke missions to screen 
the compound from any potential 
observers or mortar fire controllers. 
S u b s e q u e n t l y  a n  i n s u r g e n t 
commander told the shopkeepers at 
the Mushan bazaar to close up and go 
home because “the war has started.”
The Defence of  
Strongpoint Mushan
The number of engagements from the north bank of the river 
continued to mount in early June. In 
almost every case a patrol that was 
involved in a “Troops in Contact” 
(TIC) event was mortared once it 
returned to the strongpoint. None of 
these rounds initially made their way 
into the compound, but incoming 
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rounds were seen to bracket it 100 
metres in each direction. This was an 
indicator that a trained enemy mortar 
fire controller was present in the area. 
 Between 8 and 10 June, ISTAR 
reports indicated that the enemy 
was annoyed at what they perceived 
to be the pro-government tilt of the 
population in Mushan and intended 
to go into the bazaar and intimidate 
the merchants. One theory was 
that the intended second order 
effect was to have merchants stop 
selling fresh food to the ANA in the 
strongpoint in order to aggravate 
the supply situation. A local source 
complained to the Joint District 
Coordination Centre in Panjwayi 
about the intimidation. 
 As a result of this information, the 
company in the strongpoint surged 
two platoons into Mushan Bazaar 
as a show of force to demonstrate to 
the population that the government 
would not be intimidated. As the 
two cut-off groups deployed (see 
map) they came under enemy fire. 
One platoon, moving in behind the 
bazaar, took rounds from a grape 
hut to the west, while the second 
platoon received small arms and RPG 
fire from positions west of the old 
clinic. A Canadian Sperwer Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) 
was orbiting the battle, and a pair of 
US Air Force F-15s were available, but 
there were problems in employing 
the firepower because of the close 
proximity of the engaged forces. The 
firefights stalemated after about 30 
minutes, and then the strongpoint 
started taking fire. The Afghans in 
the run-up position machine guns 
were able to identify and engage one 
of the compounds where the enemy 
was shooting from, as did the platoon 
near the bazaar. The enemy then 
started to exfiltrate from the position 
opposite the bazaar. Warrant Officer 
John McNabb, who was not trained as 
a forward air controller, contacted the 
F-15s. The orbiting fighter-bombers 
dropped two 500-pound bombs on 
the hut and a 1000-pound bomb on 
the old clinic. These strikes reduced 
both structures to six-foot piles of 
rubble. The M-777s from Sperwan 
Ghar fired an additional five 155 mm 
rounds to catch the enemy as they 
withdrew. 
 The first platoon from the bazaar 
then swept south to link up with 
the second platoon at the old clinic, 
where they found a lot of casings and 
some salvage, but no bodies. Low on 
ammo the decision was made to head 
back to the strongpoint and call in a 
casualty evacuation flight. Two Ford 
Rangers loaded with ammo and led 
by Sergeant Major Bashir sortied out 
to the bazaar to act as a reserve as 
the withdrawal took place. The F-15s 
remained overhead as long as they 
could.
 ISTAR then reported that the 
enemy was attempting to hide its 
dead bodies and assorted body 
parts in culverts so they could deny 
the coalition forces a battle damage 
estimate. These remains were to be 
retrieved later. The enemy estimated 
it sustained 15 killed in this action.
 As the situation heated up 
throughout June, a ground resupply 
operation named ROOM SERVICE 
was spun up by an armoured combat 
team from “B” Squadron, The Lord 
Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) 
led by Major Chris Adams. This 
particular “river run” brought in an 
additional mentor and five more ANA 
soldiers, just in time for Operation 
NOLAI. The Mushan force’s role in 
NOLAI was to cross the river with 
a platoon and two mentors and then 
distract enemy forces further north 
right before they were attacked by 
an infantry company from 2 PPCLI 
and an infantry company from 
another Kandak, all supported by the 
Strathcona’s Leopard 2A6M tanks. 
The Mushan force was ordered to not 
get decisively engaged. 
 As the Afghans and Canadians 
crossed the river bed into Zharey 
district on the morning of 14 June, an 
Photos from the top:
Orders group prior to Operation NO LAI 
for 1st Company, 1 Kandak. 
Captain Matt Aggus confers with his 
Afghan counterpart during a cordon and 
search operation.
Corporal Tyler Latta on patrol.
Warrant Officer Johnny McNabb and 
Jack. 
Photos courtesy of Tyler Latta & John McNabb
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Afghan soldier spotted an insurgent 
with an RPG in a compound. As the 
platoon took up firing positions, the 
enemy unleashed a high volume of 
small arms fire against the coalition 
forces from a grape field to the west. 
An OH-58D from The Banshees, 
already on station, swept up from the 
river bed, but the communications 
between the ground forces and 
the helicopters were not working. 
Corporal Tyler Latta jumped up onto 
a wall and pointed in the direction of 
the enemy so the Banshees could go 
to work and .50 cal machine gun fire 
raked the grape field. Then between 
8 and 10 insurgents opened up from 
covered positions to the north in a 
tree line. The Afghans returned fire 
that was inaccurate but voluminous. 
Pumped on adrenalin, the RPG 
gunners fired too high, arching their 
rockets to no effect. 
 One of the other mentors, 
Corporal Tyler Latta, fired M203 
grenade rounds into the northern 
tree line to mark the target, while 
ISTAR reports confirmed that a force 
of between 10 to 15 Taliban were in 
the area. The OH-58D made multiple 
gun runs on the tree line until it had 
expended its ammunition. The snub-
nosed rocket pod was employed 
until it too was out of rockets. This 
engagement lasted 15 minutes. A 
Canadian TUAV then spotted an 
insurgent lugging an 82 mm recoilless 
rifle heading north. An orbiting 
MQ-9 Reaper subsequently ended 
this threat by dropping a 500-pound 
bomb. 
 The fire from the tree line dropped 
off and the Afghans and their mentors 
moved in, finding seven dead enemy. 
Then two elders approached, but 
some of the Afghans believed that 
they were being used to plant false 
information or worse trying to suck 
the platoon into an ambush in the 
compound complex to the northwest. 
As the OH-58D was low on fuel, it 
headed home. Once the helicopter 
departed, five insurgents opened up 
with small arms. The decision was 
Top: Operation ROOM SERVICE was the periodic Mushan resupply task executed by 
the Strathcona’s tank squadron and other mechanized forces.
Middle: A newly-acquired Canadian Forces Leopard 2 main battle tank,  moves through 
a forward operating base in Zhari District, Southern Afghanistan, 25 October 2008. The 
tanks are helping to provide support and protection for the battle group.
1st Company, 1st Kandak and it operational mentoring and liaison team on return to 
FOB Masu’m Ghar.
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made to move back to the river bed 
and hold, so a request for fire from the 
1 RCHA M-777’s at Sperwan Ghar was 
submitted. This mission could not be 
executed. With the Afghans running 
low on ammo, McNabb and Latta 
decided to use their smoke grenades 
to cover a withdrawal across the river 
bed, as an Afghan section sortied 
out from Mushan to the south bank 
to assist. However, once the platoon 
was back at Strongpoint Mushan, 
three mortar rounds landed right 
on the southwest edge of the wire. 
Shrapnel hit an Afghan commander 
in the shoulder and Captain Hyatt 
was slightly wounded. The .50 cal 
and C-6 machine guns in the towers 
immediately opened up on the point 
of origin using the “uneducated 
guess” method. ISTAR reports 
later estimated that 12 enemy were 
killed during the course of the day’s 
operations, all on the north bank of 
the river. 
 On 15 June, a similar cross-
river operation was mounted from 
Mushan, but this time the entry 
point was shifted 800 metres west. 
Starting out at 0300 hours, the probe 
ran into trouble immediately due to a 
navigation error which put them 200 
metres further west in an area that 
had virtually no cover when the sun 
came up at around 0430 hours. ISTAR 
reports indicated that the enemy “just 
went nuts” and ordered local forces 
to observe and engage as rapidly as 
possible. When this information was 
relayed to the platoon, the interpreter 
started to panic and started to urinate 
every five minutes. Some of the ANA 
soldiers started to panic too, which 
put McNabb and Latta in a bind. 
Knowing that panic is contagious 
and must be countered immediately, 
McNabb and Latta decided to have 
the “C” Troop M-777’s drop some 
smoke to the north of their location. 
ISTAR reports told the platoon that 
the enemy was worried about how 
close the smoke was to their position, 
so McNabb called in a fire mission 
of proximity-fused high explosive 
rounds in the same area after he saw 
three enemy moving in that area.
 An Afghan soldier then spotted a 
single insurgent and dispatched him 
with an RPG round. The fight was on 
as a five-man insurgent group then 
opened up on the platoon. Lieutenant 
Dawa Jan, who had been trying 
to calm the panicked interpreter, 
ordered the platoon to move back 
to the south bank. As they moved 
across, they saw that the Kutchi camp 
on the south back was being packed 
up and a trail of people were moving 
to the west. This was not a good sign. 
An ISTAR asset reported that there 
were several non-Kutchi present, 
some wearing black turbans, but 
they appeared to be unarmed. As the 
enemy fire resumed from the north 
bank, Lieutenant Jan prepared to 
move the platoon east along the river 
when an Afghan soldier spotted men 
with weapons on a wall paralleling 
the river on the south bank. The 
Sperwan Ghar M-777s fired a linear 
smoke mission, followed by a high 
explosive mission onto the wall. 
The platoon dashed across the river 
bed to secure the position. The wall, 
however, was 25 feet high which 
forced the platoon to continue east 
once more, which produced a repeat 
of the situation – the artillery fired 
smoke but then the enemy opened 
fire from the north bank. McNabb’s 
helmet was knocked off by an RPG 
blast, while Latta sought out an 
extraction route. The guns fired a 
linear HE mission down the river 
bank in a bid to stop the fire. The 
rounds “walked” down the north 
side of river and had a noticeable 
effect on the enemy’s aim. 
 As the platoon finally made 
its way back to the strongpoint, it 
came under ineffective fire from the 
bazaar. The guns from Sperwan Ghar 
now had to shift fire since combat 
outposts elsewhere along FOSTERS 
were under attack. An orbiting MQ-1 
Predator spotted four insurgents 500 
Photos from the top:
A Canadian Sperwer Tactical Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle ready for launch.
OMLT 71A at the end of the Mushan 
operations: MCpl Trevor Saina, WO John 
McNabb, MCpl Tyler Latta, Capt Matt 
Aggus, Cpl Craig White.
MCpl Tyler Latta and WO John McNabb 
at Strongpoint Mushan.
“The guys.”
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metres away from Mushan preparing 
to fire RPGs. They were successfully 
engaged with a Hellfire missile. 
 Operation NOLAI disrupted 
enemy harassing fire that was 
being directed at patrols near the 
bazaar in addition to the distraction 
generated to support the 2 PPCLI 
company operation. The heavy 
contacts during Op NOLAI, however, 
left the company in Mushan low 
on most supplies. While awaiting 
resupply, the strongpoint and its 
occupants were engaged in almost 
daily gunfights throughout June. 
The insurgents then mounted a bold 
attack on 22 June. Machine gun fire 
raked the strongpoint, while RPG 
rockets were fired from the west. 
The Canadian mentors and the ANA 
responded with a high volume of 
direct and indirect fire to ward off 
the attackers. During the course of 
the firefight, ISTAR reports indicated 
that the enemy wanted to generate 
casualties so that the coalition would 
respond with a MEDEVAC helicopter, 
which in turn was to be targeted for 
destruction. After this engagement, 
the enemy force in the Mushan area 
ran short of ammunition which 
slowed their operations for a time. 
 The next day, an ANA patrol 
noted that women and children 
were evacuating the area west of the 
bazaar. This was an ominous sign. 
Twenty-four hours later on 28 June, 
RPG volleys, small arms and now 
an 82 mm recoilless rifle poured fire 
onto the strongpoint. The Canadian 
mentors dragged out their Carl 
Gustav and fired back with 84 mm 
rocket-assisted projectiles. They also 
bombarded the attackers with the 60 
mm mortar and emptied box after 
box of .50 cal ammunition as the 
Afghans moved the Ford Rangers 
into the run-ups and engaged with 
12.7mm DshKa’s. 
 On 29 June, a smaller volume of 
small arms fire was directed at the 
Mushan force from a pair of grape 
drying huts to the northwest. The 
ANA returned fire. The next day 
what appeared to be a coordinated 
small arms attack from the northwest 
and the south west was repelled. The 
situation quieted down until 4 July 
when an ANA patrol in the bazaar was 
shot at and the strongpoint mortared. 
The insurgents said “goodbye” to 
1st Company and the 71A team with 
a devastating mortar attack which 
wounded five ANA soldiers, and 
disabled the 60 mm mortar. One of 
the wounded suffered a serious brain 
injury, which was attended to by the 
Canadian medic, Master Corporal 
Ian Mothas. Almost all of the medical 
supplies were used up. The severely 
wounded Afghan soldier later died.
Troops In Contact (TICs) – Each pin represents a contact with enemy forces. The 
top map shows the TICs for the OMLT in Panjwayi District, while the second shows 
the TICs around Strongpoint Mushan for the same period.
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Mortar Games
Th e  S t r a t h c o n a ’s  L e o p a r d s deployed again on 5 July during 
Operation ROOM SERVICE 2 and 
fought their way to Mushan, resulting 
in multiple engagements along the 
Arghandab River. 2nd Company 
and the 71B team took over from 
1st Company and 71A, who had 
deployed into a “bubble” around 
the strongpoint in order to receive 
the column. 71B and 2nd Company 
were greeted with a mortar attack 
on 9 July, which produced two more 
Afghan casualties and took out the 
communications equipment. In this 
attack, five mortar rounds were 
fired from the vicinity of the clinic 
and two hit inside the compound. 
A subsequent fire destroyed the 
accommodation tents and most of 
the strongpoint’s stores. The 71B 
commander, Captain Slade Lerch 
requested that a Joint Terminal Air 
Controller (JTAC) and other assets 
be deployed to Strongpoint Mushan 
to deal with the mortars. 
 On the return trip, the 71A team 
and the ANA company was tucked 
into the “bubble of steel” provided 
by the tanks of the Operation ROOM 
SERVICE column which snaked 
its way back along the Arghandab 
River towards Mas’um Ghar forward 
operating base. 71A’s ordeal was 
not over yet. The column was hit 
by enemy fire and Captain Matt 
Aggus dismounted with the Afghans 
to engage the ambushers as the 
Strathcona’s Leopard 2s returned fire 
with their 120 mm guns. The enemy 
fled. The column was hit again 600 
metres further along but this time 
the enemy focused on the ANA’s soft-
skinned Rangers. The enemy RPG 
and small arms fire, coming from both 
banks of the river, was inaccurate. 
The ANA stood and fought back as 
artillery was requested. Sergeant 
Abdul Haq, seeing an Afghan soldier 
fire his machine gun in a jerky and 
ineffective fashion, grabbed the 
PKM, ran up and fired the weapon, 
stunning and scattering part of the 
ambush force. Then, in what has 
to be the dumbest move in Taliban 
military history, an insurgent armed 
with an RPG ran onto the river bed 
directly in front of a Leopard 2 and 
tried to engage the tank. Two tank 
commanders apparently argued 
over who was going to take him out, 
so both fired simultaneously and 
vapourized the insurgent with 120 
mm HEAT rounds before he could 
fire his rocket launcher.
 Meanwhile, back at Strongpoint 
Mushan, Afghan National Army 
patrols were engaged from Zharey 
district any time they went near 
the bazaar and the indirect fire 
attacks continued. From 7 to 26 
July, Strongpoint Mushan and its 
occupants, now augmented to include 
seven Canadian mentors, were 
engaged on 14 separate occasions 
with various combinations of small 
arms fire, RPG attacks, and mortar 
fire. In one of these engagements, 
the strongpoint took several mortar 
rounds, one of which landed two 
metres from the mortar pit and its 
ammo stash. Captain Lerch, using 
his binoculars from one of the towers 
and covered by Corporal Duarte 
with a .50 cal machine gun, called 
down corrections to Master Warrant 
Officer Rod Dearing and Corporal 
MacDonald, who were manning the 
60 mm mortar. Corporal John Prior 
fired the 25 mm from a LAV-III with 
Master Corporal Todd Woods in the 
other tower spotting. The next day 
the insurgents held a funeral for 
their mortar expert and credited the 
“government mortar team” with the 
kill. Several Afghan soldiers received 
wounds and were medevaced by 
UH-60s covered by Banshee OH-
58Ds. The Afghans and the mentors 
maintained their rigorous patrol 
schedule in the surrounding area. 
 Operation LEWE, a sweep by “B” 
Company 2 PPCLI, was put together 
to disrupt enemy activity and give 
the strongpoint some breathing room. 
Fighting patrols from 1st Company 
and 71A, Weapons Company and 
71D, and “B” Company fanned out 
west of Mushan, which resulted in 
several TICs but no mortars. 
 At the end of July, 2nd Company 
and the 71B team returned to Mushan 
on Operation ROOM SERVICE 3, 
and Captain Aggus, Master Corporal 
Saina and Corporal Latta returned. 
While the RIP and resupply was 
An Afghan soldier has decorated his RPG 
with flowers while he patrols through a 
marijuana field in the Panjwayi district, 
August 2008.
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in progress, the enemy was bold 
enough to engage the tank leaguer 
with seven rounds of ineffective 
mortar fire the first night. When 
they tried it again the following 
night, the mortar was engaged with 
two 500-pound bombs from a pair 
of US Marine Corps F-18s, while 
insurgents manoeuvring to engage 
on the ground were discouraged from 
doing so by 120 mm gun fire from the 
Leopard 2 tanks. An estimated five 
insurgents were killed. 
 Once ensconced in the strongpoint 
and the tanks had gone home with 
the 71A team, the new occupants 
were subjected to a coordinated 
small arms direct fire and a mortar 
attack, which resulted in two mortar 
hits inside the compound and three 
casualties. On 26 July, 71B and an 
ANA patrol were engaged by a 
section of insurgents. Patience had 
worn thin and “C” Troop’s M-777’s 
from Sperwan Ghar were called into 
action to deal with the ambush. As 
if in retaliation, five mortar rounds 
were fired at the strongpoint the next 
day, but this grouping was not as 
accurate as previous attacks. None of 
the rounds landed anywhere near the 
compound. This attack was replicated 
the following day, leading some to 
speculate that a new mortar team was 
now in play. Patrols found numerous 
duds in the ground around the 
strongpoint and the ammunition was 
determined to be of Iranian origin. 
 The enemy now resorted to a new 
tactic. A delegation of people arrived 
at the Joint District Coordination 
Centre in Panjwayi town, and asked 
for a shura, which was granted. 
They petitioned the government to 
have the strongpoint and its forces 
removed. They asserted that crops 
and compounds were damaged by 
the various resupply operations and 
they demanded restitution for the 
damage. The problem was that this 
delegation did not in fact represent 
the people of Mushan at all and the 
Afghans identified one man as a 
relative of a known Taliban fighter. 
 When this approach did not 
work, small arms attacks on the 
strongpoint resumed on 14 August, 
followed by two more mortar attacks 
on 20 August. This time, an ISTAR 
system was able to identify the point 
of origin of the mortar attacks and 
the M-777’s from Sperwan Ghar 
blanketed the position with 155 
mm rounds in an effort to kill the 
mortar teams. What emerged later 
was that an enemy mortar specialist 
was brought in to replace the one 
killed in a previous engagement. 
This individual’s modus operandi 
was different. He would establish 
the mortar base plate, and sight 
in the weapon. Other insurgents, 
obviously more expendable than 
“the specialist,” were used to fire 
and reload the weapon while the 
specialist left the mortar position 
long before the counter-battery fire 
arrived. As the counter-battery fire 
improved and patrol programme 
expanded the security “bubble,” 
the enemy mortar specialist and his 
apprentices were forced to move 
north of the Arghandab River. 
Relief In Place
After its successful participation in another incursion into Zharey 
district, 1/1-205 Kandak and its 
mentors were extracted from Mushan 
and rotated back to Camp Hero 
for refitting, training, and rest by 
September 2008. Canadian engineers 
deployed to the FOB Mushan and laid 
“Rhino Snot” and Moby Matting to 
improve the helipad. Canadian CH-47 
Chinook helicopters escorted by CH-
146 Griffons took over resupply 
and RIP missions. A company from 
2/2-205 “Strike” Kandak moved 
into the FOB. Families started to 
move back into the area at this time. 
Captain Sahim Ravatullah personally 
guaranteed that he and his men 
would provide security to the area 
during a shura held with the local 
elders. Constant framework patrols 
demonstrated his resolve over a two-
week “honeymoon” period. 
 By the end of October 2008, 
relations between the local population 
and the new ANA company were 
improving. The Taliban, noting that 
the bazaar was the nexus of this 
improved relationship, established 
a rival market three kilometres west 
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A British RAF Chinook fires CHAFF 
against a detected threat before 
touching down at a 3 RCR battlegroup 
forward operating base, 22 October 
2008.
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of Mushan town with checkpoints 
to protect it and used intimidation 
patrols to demand that the locals 
close the existing bazaar near the 
FOB. Attendance at the regular bazaar 
dropped 75 percent over the course of 
one week but the ANA and the OMLT 
responded by pushing out west of 
the town. The Taliban’s response 
was to resume harassing mortar fire 
directed against FOB Mushan in late 
November and even brought in one 
of their scarce 82 mm recoilless rifles. 
On 17 November three first round 
hits eventually landed inside the 
FOB, killing two and wounding four 
Afghan soldiers, while other mortars 
were fired towards Zangabad and 
IEDs were laid on the road to the east 
in order to discourage reinforcement. 
Unlike the previous locations, the 
new mortars were emplaced by 
their teams inside houses and fired 
through holes cut in the roof. Clearly, 
any aerial retaliation which resulted 
in destroyed buildings and dead 
civilian “human shields” would 
be exploited by the enemy and 
condemned by the Western media. 
ISTAR reports confirmed that this 
was another professional team that 
had infiltrated from Pakistan. As 
US Army UH-60s conducted the 
MEDEVAC, Canadian M-777s and a 
British 81 mm mortar team from 42 
Commando worked with the OMLT 
and the ANA to suppress the new 
enemy teams as best they could given 
the new circumstances.
 “M” Company, 3 RCR eventually 
surged into the area and captured 
three mortar tubes. One was still 
warm after being fired. After these 
operations, the bazaar near the FOB 
re-opened. In January 2009 the local 
merchants told the ANA that they 
were not getting the same amount of 
business in the “Taliban bazaar” and 
preferred the previous arrangements 
where they could make real money. 
End Game
Strongpoint Mushan was clearly a disruptive element to the 
enemy programme for Panjwayi 
and Zharey districts as evidenced 
by the significant resources, varied 
and escalatory methods, and scarce 
expertise the insurgents employed in 
their attempts to remove the coalition 
presence. The willingness of the 
Afghan soldiers to continuously exert 
a presence in the area, even if it was 
limited at times to a three-kilometer 
security “bubble,” demonstrated to 
the population that the government 
was there to stay, even while under 
heavy contact over several days. The 
question of how to expand that bubble 
so that governance and development 
activities could expand was not 
addressed during that time, given 
the security situation. In the Afghan 
cultural context of the war, the sort of 
obstinacy projected by the defenders 
of Strongpoint Mushan can have a 
positive effect on the population – if 
the message is conveyed properly 
by both the defenders themselves 
with a PSYOPS team, with CIMIC 
quick impact projects, and by the 
provincial and national governments 
via their methods. Sadly, this level of 
coordination does not yet exist within 
the Afghan National Army structure 
and they remain dependent on the 
coalition forces for such support. 
As of February 2009, Strongpoint 
Mushan continues to hold and 
provide a security presence to the 
people at the western end of Panjwayi 
district.
Notes
1. A note on sources: The author was 
present in the spring and summer of 
2008 for the Route Fosters “duel” and 
observed it from several levels. During 
a research trip to the forward-deployed 
elements of the OMLT in the summer 
of 2008 I interviewed the personnel 
involved in the Mushan operations as 
they rotated out of the position. I would 
especially like to thank Lieutenant-
Colonel Dan Drew, Major Dave Proctor, 
Master Warrant Officer Rod Dearing, 
and Warrant Officer Chuck Cote for 
their insights into OMLT operations 
at this time. I would also like to thank 
Corporal Tyler Latta, Warrant Officer John 
McNabb, and Captain Matt Aggus for 
sharing their experiences with me. I also 
was briefed by the army aviators from 
“Company “B,” 2-17 Cavalry on their role 
supporting Canadian and Afghan forces 
in Panjwayi district. I would also like 
to thank Lieutenant Candice Dunn and 
“C” Troop, “B” Battery 1 RCHA. Major 
Steve Nolan, Captain Sean French, and 
Warrant Officer Joe Doucette from the 
follow-on OMLT rotation, assisted me 
with the events of late 2008. Note that 
certain control measures and intelligence 
collection assets have been blurred in 
this narrative for operational security 
considerations. Some names have been 
altered to avoid personal embarrassment.
2. The Canadian soldiers from 71A asked 
me to note that they do not view their 
actions at Mushan as extraordinary in 
the context of what other elements of the 
OMLT were engaged in at the time in 
Zharey and Panjwayi districts throughout 
2008 and wanted to convey that this is but 
one action in the course of their tour in 
Afghanistan. They took pains to express 
to me their concerns about being labelled 
“self-aggrandizing” by others because 
their actions appeared in print and other 
actions did not. The full story of the 
OMLT and its other operations during 
that time will be told in a future narrative 
so that all OMLT elements receive equal 
historical recognition for their efforts.
3. The Kutchi are nomadic and can be found 
throughout Afghanistan. They tend to 
live in domed tents and keep camel, 
sheep, and donkey herds in addition to 
various agrarian pursuits. 
4. At least from this particular rotation.
5. Those who observed this attack remain 
psychologically scarred by it.
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